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ABSTRACT: We discuss alternative approaches to define and measure the affordability of energy 
consumption. We then focus on energy vulnerability in Italy and on the benefit schemes that 
compensate households in needs for their spending on energy services. We identify the potential 
beneficiaries of these subsidies in 2012 and investigate if their eligibility criterion is effective in 
targeting public resources to families in a state of energy vulnerability. (67 words) 
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1. Introduction 
In this study, we aim at providing evidence on vulnerable consumers in the Italian domestic 
energy markets. By exploiting a large household survey and alternative indices, we investigate 
electricity and gas affordability in 2012; we then illustrate the Italian program of gas and electricity 
benefits in support of low-income households and assess its ability to actually target the 
households in needs. 
In this perspective, we shortly present the debate about the concepts of affordability and the 
statistical indices that are typically adopted to assess the issue. Each approach can produce a 
somehow different picture of households’ vulnerability in energy consumptions and the recent 
report by Hills (2012) provides evidence of the lively debate on this issue. The key point is that the 
ideal affordability indicator should accommodate - with appropriate weights – numerous 
elements. On the one hand, it should be sensitive to changes in supply side variables (i.e. energy 
prices, technology, quality of service) and, on the other one, it must take into consideration 
consumers’ needs and preferences. This seems to be a particularly complex goal, given the 
heterogeneity of the households’ living conditions (e.g. climate, type of housing), and composition 
(e.g. number of family members, presence of children and/or elderly and disabled). 
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Based on our discussion on the pros and cons of the different affordability measures, we look at 
the affordability issue in the Italian domestic energy markets in 2012, using the annual European 
Union Surveys on Income and Living Conditions (SILC). On this database, we implement indices of 
affordability based on the incidence of the energy expenditure on the Italian family budget, as well 
as two ad hoc variations of the Low Income High Cost (LIHC) index proposed by Hills for fuel 
poverty in the UK. Moreover, we also consider self-assessed indicators of energy vulnerability, 
such as the presence of leaking roofs or broken windows, the inability to keep the house 
adequately warm and the presence of arrears for utility bills. As expected, the picture one gets on 
the extent of energy affordability problems substantially depends on how one defines and 
measures it. 
Finally, we evaluate the effectiveness of the energy benefit system introduced in Italy in 2008. 
In particular, we investigate to what extent the eligibility rules really benefit households with 
energy affordability problems. Our results highlight that the eligibility rules are affected by several 
limitations: overall, about 15% of the households in absolute poverty do not meet the criteria, 
only 43% of the households at risk of poverty and no more than 61% of those with energy 
affordability problems qualify for the benefits 
The rest of paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present alternative measures of 
affordability. In Section 3, we describe the Italian program of energy benefits. In Section 4 we 
empirically investigate the measures of affordability on Italian data; we then consider the 
potential beneficiaries of the Italian energy benefits providing estimates of the probability of being 
eligible, given that the household is energy poor. Policy implications are then discussed in the 
Conclusions (Section 5).  
2 Energy affordability indicators and their measurement 
In this Section we first present the most common affordability measures, based on the 
incidence of energy spending on total household expenditure or income (subsection 2.1); we then 
illustrate indicators based on the LIHC approach suggested by Hills (2012), also proposing some 
modifications (subsection 2.2). 
2.1 Affordability indices based on energy budget shares 
The general idea behind this approach is that energy consumption is part of an essential basket 
of consumption goods, which every household should be able to afford in order to have a 
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“normal” standard of living, characterized by normal heating conditions and consumption of 
household appliances services. In practice, a household is considered to face an affordability issue 
if its energy budget share exceeds a critical threshold, determined – more or less arbitrarily – by 
the policy makers. Accordingly, that household should be considered as part of the target 
population of any policy aimed at reducing energy poverty.  
 In this context, a headcount index is the percentage of consumers who spend on energy more 
than a given fraction of their income or total expenditure. In most studies, this critical threshold 
has been fixed between 5% and 10%, depending on the good/service considered.1  In so doing, 
such index – as the underlying concept of affordability – does not incorporate any information 
about the desirable minimum amount of consumption of energy and other goods.  
Formally, define hx  the total observed expenditure for household h, corresponding to the sum 
of the expenditure in energy, u
hx , and the actual expenditure in all other consumption items, 
c
hx . 
According to this approach, a household has problems of sustainability of its energy consumption 
if the ratio 
h
u
hh xxr /  is larger than a given threshold 
ur . Considering a population, the extent of 
the sustainability problem is measured by the fraction of households for which u
h rr  , i.e. by the 
Headcount Index (HI): 









    
where N is the total number of households and  uhr r1  is an indicator function, which equals 
one whenever the condition in parentheses holds, and zero otherwise. The index HI in [1] tells us 
the fraction of the households which spend more than a given "reasonable amount" (in proportion 
to available resources) for energy consumptions. Notice that [1] does not incorporate any 
qualitative information on the amount of minimum/ desirable consumption, both for energy and 
for other goods or services.  
However, such notion cannot provide useful indications on either the extent of the affordability 
problem, or its depth. As for the former issue, it does not include among the fuel poor those 
households in absolute poverty that decide – because of economic constraints - to spend very 
little on energy services. Moreover, it can label as “fuel poor” some relatively well-off households 
                                                          
1
 See about Fankhauser and Tepic (2007), Chaplin and Freeman (1999), Hancock (1993), Healy (2001), Sefton, (2001), Sefton and 
Chesshire, (2005), Waddams Price et al. (2012). 
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that are characterized by high energy consumption. 2 
2.2 Affordability indices based on Low Income High Cost (LIHC) approach  
As highlighted in Miniaci et al. (2008a, 2014b), the indices based on the budget share 
completely neglect the fact that spending in energy services can become problematic when it 
leaves a household insufficient income to consume other goods or services, namely when the 
household’s “residual income” is too low.  Considering a residual income approach, there is a 
problem of energy affordability if - after paying the energy bills - the household does not have 
sufficient financial resources to fund the minimum level of consumption of other goods/services.3 
Note that this approach highlights the financial difficulties induced by the consumption of public 
utilities (Stone, 1993). This approach permits to disentangle at least three types of households 
whose affordability problems have different origins: 
(i) households unable to access the minimum amount of both essential commodities and energy 
services: in this case, the problem of energy affordability can be alleviated by a mechanism of 
general income support, not conditional to the actual level of energy consumption; 
(ii) households with limited income, which over-consume energy: in this case, an appropriately 
targeted action should address the reason why this happens (i.e. preferences, technological 
constraints, inefficient equipment, etc.); 
(iii)  households whose energy consumption is below the minimum standard due to monetary or 
non-monetary constraints (e.g. , lack of access to gas or electricity networks): in this case, 
interventions should first be aimed at removing these constraints. 
The Low Income High Cost  (LIHC) approach suggested by Hills (2012) combines elements of the 
residual income approach discussed above, with those of the budget share approach introduced in 
the previous subsection.  In particular, the LIHC approach classifies households as energy poor if: 
- their disposable income minus the necessary spending in energy results lower than the 
European Union relative poverty line,4 and 
- the ratio between their necessary spending in energy over their disposable income results 
lower than the median national energy budget share, 
                                                          
2
 The problem of affordability in energy consumption has been firstly investigated in UK where it has been labelled as “fuel 
poverty” (see Defra 2001 and 2007).  
3 The field where the notion of residual income was first introduced is housing economics (Thalmann, 2003). 
4
 The EU relative poverty line may differ from the relative poverty lines computed by the national statistical offices 
because of the different equivalence scales adopted. 
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where the necessary spending in energy is the expenditure needed to keep the house adequately 
warm, irrespectively of actual energy consumption. By referring to necessary rather than to actual 
energy expenditure, this approach avoids to “misclassify” those households that over-consume 
energy without needing to, as well as those that under-consume energy but that would need to 
consume more to live in an adequately heated home. Although appealing, Hills’ approach can 
hardly be implemented to countries other than the UK, for at least two reasons: 
- it is particularly data demanding, as it requires an accurate estimate of households' energy 
needs given the characteristics of their accommodations, data that are often unavailable in 
continental Europe and in the US; 
- it refers to national median energy budget shares, which may be appropriate when applied to 
an area/country where climatic conditions are relatively homogeneous. 
We thus consider a modified version of the LIHC approach, where we use actual energy 
expenditure (rather than necessary spending) and, given the territorial variety of the Italy, we use 
regional specific budget share thresholds.  
Formally, consider an household h with an actual level of energy expenditure u
hx ; this 
household has a residual income 𝑅𝐼ℎ , defined as 
u
h h hRI x x  , that is  the difference between its 
total disposable income 𝑥ℎ and its energy expenditure 
u
hx . Such an household is energy poor 
according the LIHE approach if its residual income falls below the relative poverty line xrp and its 
energy budget share /uh h hr x x   is larger than a given threshold 
ur . The headcount index 
associated with the modified LIHC approach, say LIHC1, is: 
[2]       1
1LIHC u rp u
h h h
h
HI x x x r r
N
    1 1  
In our opinion, both the original LIHC and its revised version LIHC1 suffer of the same problem: 
in order to assess the households’ ability to pay, they both refer to relative poverty rather than to 
absolute poverty and the residual income (i.e., net of energy costs) is compared to full income 
(that includes resources for energy spending). By doing so, the criteria do not consider as deprived 
those households with low income and low (necessary or actual) energy expenditure. In other 
words, the criteria are likely to exclude from the set of vulnerable consumers those households, 
whose lack of income induces them to spend too little in energy services. 
In order to avoid misclassifying these households in need, we suggest a further modification to 
the LIHC criterion, according to which we consider as vulnerable those household: 
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- whose their disposable income  is lower than the absolute poverty line, or 
- the ratio of their actual spending in energy over their disposable income results larger than the 
regional specific median energy budget share. 
The headcount index associated with this modified LIHC approach, say LIHC2, is: 
 
[2]         1
1LIHC ap u ap u
h h h h
h
HI x x r r x x r r
N
        
  1 1 1 1   
where xap denotes the absolute poverty line. 
By using the LIHC2 criterion, we would include all the households that cannot afford the minimum 
quantity of energy without consuming too little of the other goods (first criterion), plus the 
households that consume “too” high a fraction of their income for energy. So, while LIHC1 tends 
to excludes poor households not spending enough on energy, LIHC2 tends to include some high-
income household spending too much on energy. 
3 Electricity and gas benefits in Italy 
The Italian policy concerning benefits for electricity and gas to vulnerable consumers has been 
set forth by the Law 205 of 23 December 2005, and then implemented through two Ministerial 
Decrees in 2007 for electricity and 2008 for gas. The declared aim of the policy is to provide 
support in energy consumption to:  
i) households living in poverty - or on its margins;  
ii) large households. 
And in case of electricity, also to: 
iii) households which include a disabled, or a critically ill person (i.e. using medical device).  
The policy is funded through specific components in transmission or distribution, paid by all 
consumers. 
The income eligibility criteria for electricity and for gas benefits are the same; in both cases, the 
spending ability of the family is tested by using a synthetic indicator called ISEE (the acronym for 
“Indicatore di Situazione Economica Equivalente”, that is, Equivalent Economic Conditions 
Indicator). This indicator combines information about income, real and financial assets, family 
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composition and occupational status of household members. To be eligible, the household's 
equivalent income indicator must not exceed 7,500 Euro, unless the family includes more than 
three dependent children; in this case the threshold is increased to 20,000 euro.   
Given that the benefits are paid in the form of lump-sum discounts on the electricity and gas 
bills, a necessary eligibility condition is that the household must be a domestic customer in its 
primary residence. In case of electricity, some limits to the installed power must be met (3 kW for 
up to 4 household members, 4.5 kW if more), unless the household includes a person who needs 
essential electro-medical appliances. In the case of gas, the benefit is given to the eligible 
households in the form of discount in bills for domestic customers having an individual contract, 
and with a postal order for customers having a condominium contract (i.e. usually due to the 
presence of centralised heating). 
All domestic customers that meet the above criteria can apply for the benefits by filing a form 
to the municipality of residence. Given that the eligibility criteria are independent of consumption 
levels, the ubiquity of the power grid guarantees that (de facto) all households meeting the above 
income requisites are potential beneficiaries of the electricity benefit. The coverage of the gas 
benefit is instead jeopardized by the non-universal diffusion of the natural gas. In particular, the 
gas distribution grid does not serve many mountainous areas and the entire Sardinia region. This 
in practice makes the pool of eligible households for the gas benefit a subset of the households 
eligible for the electricity benefit.  
The amount of the electricity benefit depends on the number of households components and it 
is independent of actual consumption (with the exception of the presence of electro-medical 
appliances, where it is calculated on the ground of the electricity usage intensity). In 2012, it 
ranged between 63 euro per year for a couple and 139 euro for a household with more than 4 
members (plus 10% VAT). The amount of gas benefit is proportional to family size and depends on 
the classification of the municipality according to its typical winter temperature, and to the 
adoption of natural gas for heating. In this case, the value of the benefit ranged from 85 euro for a 
household with less than 5 members living in the warmest part of the county, to 318 euro for a 
household with at least 5 members living in the coldest areas (plus 21% VAT). Notice that the 
design of the gas benefit implies that households heating their homes with fuels other than 
natural gas are implicitly penalized by this system.  
8 
 
 4 Energy poverty and energy benefits in Italy 
To describe the incidence of energy poverty in Italy using the alternative approaches introduced in 
Section 2, and to assess to what extent the benefits’ policy described in Section 3 is actually 
capable of channelling resources toward vulnerable consumers, we first need to define some 
parameters for the empirical analysis as follows.  
 4.1 Setting the parameters for the empirical analysis 
In the aim to apply the above measures of energy affordability to Italy, we have to set two 
preliminary steps:  
(i) define the relative and absolute poverty lines (xrp and xap, respectively),  
(ii) define the threshold ( ur ) above which the budget share indicates the presence of an 
affordability problem.  
We exploit the Eurostat - Istat “Survey on Income and Living Conditions” (EU-SILC) to estimate 
these crucial values according to a variety of criteria. This survey is particularly suitable for this 
aim, as it provides information on demographic, housing, occupational, and income variables for a 
representative sample of about 20,000 Italian households.  
Table 1 shows some preliminary descriptive statistics to frame the Italian context, i.e. the average 
monthly disposable income5 and the expenditure for energy, by household size and climatic 
classification of the area of residence in Italy, in 2012. As already noticed in Miniaci et al (2008a, 
2008b, 2014), the expenditure for gas and other fuels shows a significant variability across climatic 
areas: a family of two components in a cold region spends more that the double that a similar 
family in a warm region. For electricity instead, it is the number of household members that 
mainly affects the level of expenditure, while the area of residence plays a limited role. 
  
                                                          
5
Disposable income is defined as the household income, net of taxes and contribution to the social security system, 
including imputed rents. 
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Table 1: Average monthly disposable income and expenditure for energy, by household 
size and climatic classification of the area of residence.  
 
Disposable income 
# hh members Warm Mild Temperate Cold Total 
1 1501.84 1893.44 1829.49 2026.90 1883.36 
2 2219.11 2897.49 2816.17 3328.81 2984.20 
3 2673.25 3363.66 3715.36 3980.92 3556.29 
4 2966.35 3722.64 3911.38 4503.47 3863.51 
5 + 3073.76 3907.92 4410.94 4459.07 3930.55 
Total 2340.11 2895.95 2950.12 3238.69 2953.29 
        Electricity expenditure   
# hh members Warm Mild Temperate Cold Total 
1 36.38 31.30 29.08 30.32 31.37 
2 50.29 42.07 39.65 41.74 42.87 
3 59.73 52.44 47.04 50.19 52.09 
4 61.64 53.09 54.46 58.35 57.34 
5 + 67.38 59.50 64.59 61.69 63.20 
Total 52.14 43.87 41.48 42.78 44.61 
        Gas and other fuels expenditure 
# hh members Warm Mild Temperate Cold Total 
1 34.71 56.74 60.50 91.06 70.17 
2 47.92 71.21 82.81 119.40 92.33 
3 53.01 78.55 87.56 118.44 92.80 
4 57.52 75.99 90.07 125.22 92.20 
5 + 59.15 78.94 105.90 126.45 93.70 
Total 48.24 69.63 79.20 110.89 85.59 
Source: Istat “Survey on Income and Living Conditions” (EU-SILC), 2012. 
Table 2: Average monetary value of the minimum reference for total monthly expenditure and energy 
components, by household size and climatic classification of the area of residence. 
 
Relative Absolute poverty line 
# hh members poverty line Warm Mild Temperate Cold Total 
1 740.71 603.19 707.96 709.10 797.64 733.91 
2 1234.51 854.86 973.28 978.03 1102.34 1017.01 
3 1641.90 1108.65 1231.26 1240.16 1399.71 1284.43 
4 2012.26 1358.23 1489.40 1472.06 1698.63 1535.10 
5 + 2434.20 1605.91 1752.95 1798.02 2010.59 1808.53 
Total 1353.79 1002.09 1081.77 1067.36 1180.91 1109.51 





Table 2 presents the relative poverty line and the average monthly absolute poverty line, by 
household size and climatic classification of the area of residence. We compute the relative 
income poverty line mimicking the definition of the expenditure poverty line for Italy adopted by 
the Italian Statistical Office (Istat). That is, the poverty line for a two-member household is equal 
to the average per capital household disposable income, and the value for other family size is 
adjusted using the Carbonaro equivalence scale. The disposable income is calculated as household 
income net of taxes and contribution to the social security system, and including imputed rents. 
The absolute poverty line for each family sampled by the survey is set following the definition of 
official Italian poverty line (Istat 2009), and it is, by construction, regional specific.  
Different options are available in order to define the values of the threshold ur  necessary to 
define the measure based on the budget shares approach. In the present analysis, we consider 
two criteria: 
a) A “median budget share” approach, that looks at the balance sheets of households with low 
purchasing power and defines the maximum sustainable threshold ( ur ) as the median value of 
the share of energy expenditure for the households in relative poverty. This threshold is 
conditional on household size and geographical area and varies over time due to changes in 
relative prices and household consumption decisions. 
b) An “European Commission (EC) criterion”, that leads to a measure mimicking what has been 
used in a European Commission Report (2010), i.e. the threshold is twice the ratio between the 
average energy expenditure over the average total expenditure. We implement this criterion 
with two modifications: 1) using disposable income instead of total expenditure, and 2) using 
averages (of both expenditure and disposable income) conditional on household size and 
climatic area.6  
Table 3 shows the difference between thresholds computed according to criteria (a) and (b). In 
particular, the table highlights that for households up to four members the threshold calculated 
according to the median budget shares approach are higher than those calculated with the EC 
criterion. As a consequence, we expect the incidence of energy poverty to appear to be lower 
when the threshold is set in accordance to the median budget share approach rather than the EC 
criterion.  
                                                          
6
 The first modification is dictated by the lack of a reliable measure of total expenditure in the EU-SILC dataset, and in 
any case, income is probably a more sensible denominator in such ratio. The second modification is suggested by the 




Table 3: Critical thresholds r
u
 for budget share approach. Median budget shares: median budget shares of the 
relatively poor, by household size and climatic classification of the area of residence. EC criterion: 2* Average 
expenditure / Average income, by household size and climatic classification of the area of residence. 
  Median budget shares  EC criterion 
# hh members Warm Mild Temperate Cold Warm Mild Temperate Cold 
1 10.10 13.97 15.83 17.51 9.47 9.30 9.79 11.98 
2 9.46 10.51 10.23 13.13 8.85 7.82 8.70 9.68 
3 9.43 8.56 8.69 10.82 8.43 7.79 7.25 8.47 
4 6.64 7.79 7.92 9.22 8.03 6.94 7.39 8.15 
5 + 6.61 7.29 6.11 6.92 8.23 7.09 7.73 8.44 
Source: Istat “Survey on Income and Living Conditions” (EU-SILC), 2012. 
4.2 Setting the affordability of energy consumption and the benefits’ coverage 
As already mentioned, we exploit the EU-SILC data to empirically investigate the incidence of 
energy poverty in Italy as captured by alternative approaches presented in Section 2. Moreover, to 
assess to what extent the benefits’ policy - described in Section 3 - is actually capable of 
channelling resources toward vulnerable consumers, we also make use of the Istat estimate of 
taxable labour income for each household in the survey; this information is necessary to compute 
the Equivalent Economic Conditions Indicator (ISEE), and therefore the eligibility status for the 
energy benefits.  
Unfortunately, the EU-SILC dataset has some limitations. First, information on real and financial 
assets is not as detailed as information on income sources. Therefore the amount of real and 
financial wealth can only be estimated on the basis of fiscal and financial income data (see Miniaci 
et al. 2014, see Appendix C, for details). Second, the data do not reliably identify the households 
that could benefit of the electricity benefit for health reasons; therefore, we will focus exclusively 
on the eligible households of electricity benefits for economic hardship, which anyway are the vast 
majority of the entire audience. Third, some approximation is necessary also for gas; in fact, the 
questionnaire does not distinguish between the use of natural gas and other kinds of gas (e.g., 
LPG), thereby leading to an overestimation of the pool of eligible customers. 
Table 4 presents average income, percentage of income poor, eligible households, and households 
with affordability problems considering household size, area of residence, degree of urbanization, 
tenure status and dwelling type. Here “Poor” households are those with adult equivalent income 
below the absolute poverty line, and the households “At risk of poverty”, according to Eurostat, 
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are those with adult equivalent income lower than 60% of median adult equivalent income. We 
compute the percentage of households with affordability problems following three different 
methods: i) the budget share approach (with thresholds set the as the median budget shares or 
according to the EC criterion); ii) the modified Low Income High Cost approach (i.e. LICH1 and 
LICH2 in Section 2.2); and iii) relying on self-assessed indicators of potential problems with housing 
conditions and energy costs. As for iii), the EU-SILC questionnaire asks the households if they have 
problems of leaking roofs, damp walls/floors or rot in windows frames or floor; if they can afford 
to keep their home adequately warm; and if they have been unable to pay on time due to financial 
difficulties for utility bills. The answers to these three questions are informative on the 
sustainability of the energy costs and on the energy efficiency of the accommodation.7 
 
                                                          
7
 Notice that the answer these three questions in the EU-SILC questionnaire are taken as components for 
the Eurostat multidimensional deprivation index. 
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Table 4: Average income, percentage of income poor, eligible households, and households with affordability problems. Equivalent income (euro per month): household income net of taxes and 
contribution to the social security system, including imputed rents, divided by the equivalence scale used for the definition of the absolute poverty line. Poor: households whose adult equivalent 
income is below the absolute poverty line. At risk of poverty: households whose adult equivalent income is lower than 60% of median adult equivalent income. Median budget shares: median 
budget shares of the relatively poor, by household size and climatic classification of the area of residence. EC criterion: 2* Average expenditure / Average income, by household size and climatic 
classification of the area of residence. LIHE1: (Income – energy spending < EC relative poverty line) AND (energy budget share > median budget share). LIHE2: (Income < absolute poverty line) OR 
(energy budget share > median budget share). 
      
With energy affordability problems (%) 
    
Benefit eligible (%) Budget share approach 
Low Income High 
























Total 2,817.67 6.31 19.39 11.34 8.97 8.93 13.84 6.96 11.41 20.80 21.49 9.56 
Household types 
            Single 3,138.89 6.80 24.48 11.38 8.32 6.91 15.07 5.33 10.43 20.35 24.37 6.16 
2 adults, less than 65 yrs 3,277.55 5.66 12.70 7.93 5.96 6.73 11.06 5.75 9.02 19.04 18.43 9.80 
2 adults, at least one 65 yrs 2,892.89 1.06 12.43 9.03 7.43 5.75 12.28 3.22 6.16 20.46 20.26 3.86 
Others, no children  3,021.59 2.06 11.04 5.97 5.01 6.48 8.68 4.18 6.98 23.41 22.36 10.64 
Single parent  1,867.68 23.69 38.29 33.48 27.81 25.10 35.28 21.15 34.16 22.47 24.31 17.74 
2 adults, 1 child 2,483.17 6.91 16.21 10.47 8.38 9.60 13.87 8.23 11.88 19.44 16.08 12.56 
2 adults, 2 children 2,170.24 8.70 23.42 13.01 11.24 13.40 14.77 11.32 16.05 19.68 18.95 14.04 
2 adults, 3 or more 
children 1,732.16 19.96 36.26 35.62 26.60 25.37 22.68 22.24 30.61 25.44 25.70 19.25 
Others with children 2,294.41 7.52 21.81 12.27 10.54 13.19 10.36 9.95 15.36 23.69 24.15 18.56 
Region 
            North 3,152.95 4.58 11.83 6.47 5.51 6.45 12.92 4.45 8.58 18.80 12.66 7.36 
Centre 3,042.33 4.97 16.72 8.57 7.27 5.94 10.22 4.37 8.16 21.33 17.23 9.37 
South and Islands 2,166.71 9.80 32.57 20.50 15.30 14.58 17.50 12.39 17.75 23.51 37.60 13.01 
Source: Istat “Survey on Income and Living Conditions” (EU-SILC), 2012. 
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Table 4 continued: Average income, percentage of income poor, eligible households, and households with affordability problems. Equivalent income (euro per month): household income net 
of taxes and contribution to the social security system, including imputed rents, divided by the equivalence scale used for the definition of the absolute poverty line. Poor: households whose adult 
equivalent income is below the absolute poverty line. At risk of poverty: households whose adult equivalent income is lower than 60% of median adult equivalent income. Median budget shares: 
median budget shares of the relatively poor, by household size and climatic classification of the area of residence. EC criterion: 2* Average expenditure / Average income, by household size and 
climatic classification of the area of residence. LIHC1: (Income – energy spending < EC relative poverty line) AND (energy budget share > median budget share). LIHC2: (Income < absolute poverty 
line) OR (energy budget share > median budget share). 
      
With energy affordability problems (%) 
    
Benefit eligible (%) Budget share approach 
Low Income High 
























Total 2,817.67 6.31 19.39 11.34 8.97 8.93 13.84 6.96 11.41 20.80 21.49 9.56 
Degree of urbanisation  
           Densely populated area 3,058.29 6.63 17.53 11.10 9.36 7.65 11.85 5.99 10.51 18.88 18.35 10.07 
Intermediate area 2,713.91 5.53 19.03 9.97 7.92 9.13 14.18 6.96 11.12 22.74 23.40 9.77 
Thinly populated area 2,416.15 7.40 25.39 15.41 10.50 11.93 18.44 9.59 14.60 21.24 25.35 7.62 
Tenure status 
            Outright owner 3,064.90 3.18 17.41 6.24 4.71 7.13 11.69 4.91 8.13 18.90 19.87 5.48 
Owner paying mortgage 3,018.82 3.02 9.23 3.76 3.13 7.32 9.78 4.90 8.35 18.58 13.85 12.92 
Tenant at market rent  1,964.86 19.65 27.44 33.55 28.26 16.91 25.15 16.16 25.00 25.46 30.43 18.95 
Tenant at reduced rent 2,052.95 13.20 30.01 28.57 23.80 11.95 19.96 10.20 18.26 35.19 31.05 25.63 
Free accommodation 2,547.16 8.55 30.47 14.34 9.23 9.81 14.04 8.18 13.91 22.15 25.35 8.96 
Dwelling type 
            Detached house 2,758.00 5.19 21.51 9.49 7.00 12.62 17.95 8.82 13.95 26.44 23.62 8.32 
Semi-detached house 2,687.72 5.30 20.03 10.42 8.02 8.81 13.41 6.75 10.72 23.27 21.88 9.30 
In building < 10 units 2,660.59 8.28 21.18 14.53 11.43 8.64 13.40 7.73 12.03 19.80 26.44 11.60 
In building ≥ 10 units 3,141.28 6.05 15.26 10.39 8.94 6.58 11.64 5.03 9.40 15.09 14.86 8.83 
Source: Istat “Survey on Income and Living Conditions” (EU-SILC), 2012. 
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Considering the results in Table 4, we notice that, no matter the definition of energy affordability 
we adopt, low income categories are those with highest incidence of energy poverty. So, for 
instance, the “single parents” households are those with the lowest per capita disposable income 
(1,867.68 euro per month), result to be those with the highest percentage in absolute poverty and at risk of 
poverty (23.7% and 38.3% respectively) and also those affected by the highest incidence of energy poverty. 
In general, changing the definition of energy poverty or a component of its indicator has two major effects 
on the assessment of energy affordability. On the one hand, it can change significantly the level of energy 
poverty measured: going from the “objective” criterion LIHC1 to the “subjective” criterion relying on the 
self-assessment of being able to keep the home warm shift the incidence of energy poverty in the entire 
population from 7% to 21.5%. On the other hand, it can remarkably change the identification of the group 
of household most/least in need. For instance, according to the budget share approach if one takes the EC 
criterion as a threshold, one-person households are more in need than the households classified as “others 
with children”, but the conclusion is reversed if the critical threshold is the median budget share. The table 
provides illuminating evidence on how the choice of the instrument adopted to measure the phenomenon 
can have dramatic effects on the policy decisions, both in terms of assessment of its relevance and 
targeting of the intervention. 
Although higher levels of energy poverty are typically associated with lower disposable income, the type of 
accommodation seems to play a major role in determining energy vulnerability. The second part of 
Table 4 highlights that detached houses have the poorest maintenance conditions, and that their 
inhabitants are more likely to have energy affordability problems, despite the fact that they are 
relatively well off. The high incidence of energy poverty among tenants is also potentially due to 
the combination of their low income together with the low energy efficiency of their houses. 
As the eligibility criterion is explicitly designed to target low-income households, we expect the 
percentage of eligible households to vary across groups together with the incidence of absolute 
poverty and the percentage of households at risk of poverty.  The percentage of eligible 
households is always higher for the electricity benefit than for the gas one. This is particularly 
relevant in the southern regions and islands due to the geographical limitation of the gas 
distribution grid and the differences in gas consumption in areas with different climatic conditions. 
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Table 5: Percentage of eligible households among  poor households, households at risk of poverty and households with affordability problems. Poor: household whose adult equivalent income 
is below the absolute poverty line. At risk of poverty: households whose adult equivalent income is lower than 60% of median adult equivalent income. Median budget shares: median budget 
shares of the relatively poor, by household size and climatic classification of the area of residence. EC criterion: 2* Average expenditure / Average income, by household size and climatic 
classification of the area of residence. LIHE1: (Income – energy spending < EC relative poverty line) AND (energy budget share > median budget share). LIHE2: (Income < absolute poverty line) OR 
(energy budget share > median budget share). 
 Percentage of households eligible for electricity benefits Percentage of households eligible for gas benefits 
   
With energy affordability problems 
  
With energy affordability problems 
   
Budget share  approach 
Low Income High 
Costs 
  
Budget share  approach 










LIHC1 LIHC2 Poor 







Total 84.59 43.36 48.45 38.21 61.23 56.01 68.03 34.35 41.81 33.24 52.85 45.48 
Household types 
            Single 75.47 34.19 45.30 31.83 57.35 55.18 55.31 25.07 38.01 26.70 48.10 40.91 
2 adults, less than 65 yrs 81.95 48.32 49.39 39.20 57.75 57.30 61.34 35.42 37.34 31.07 43.66 42.74 
2 adults, at least one 65 yrs 78.94 33.17 27.73 20.22 45.09 31.48 78.24 26.32 24.07 18.26 38.54 27.95 
Others, no children  86.13 37.96 30.99 24.95 46.07 35.71 66.96 31.92 25.37 20.73 37.69 27.60 
Single parent  93.52 70.51 70.57 61.75 83.76 76.36 75.53 58.54 63.89 54.50 75.83 63.88 
2 adults, 1 child 89.40 51.60 50.15 43.96 58.38 58.67 79.05 42.71 44.68 39.69 52.00 51.26 
2 adults, 2 children 88.54 48.55 52.97 50.57 62.70 58.70 75.84 41.18 49.01 48.91 58.02 51.57 
2 adults, 3 or more children 98.12 76.80 73.29 75.12 83.11 77.66 78.13 60.31 58.77 59.42 66.54 61.27 
Others with children 88.98 46.60 46.41 45.20 59.88 52.86 79.18 40.16 41.56 39.92 54.37 46.86 
Region 
            North 75.62 36.80 35.57 26.67 50.44 45.02 66.87 32.00 32.68 24.80 46.48 40.05 
Centre 83.67 36.38 48.60 36.49 63.11 58.33 72.43 30.86 44.83 34.20 58.36 50.52 
South and Islands 91.26 49.24 57.07 51.82 66.73 63.44 67.46 36.76 47.18 42.38 55.13 48.02 






Table 5 shows the percentage of eligible households among poor households, households at risk 
of poverty and households with affordability problems according to the budget share or the Low 
Income High Costs approaches. Among the absolute poor, we observe that about 15% of them are 
not eligible for the electricity benefits and 32% are not eligible for gas benefits. Among households 
at risk of poverty, only 43% are eligible for the electricity benefits and 34% for the gas ones. 
Considering the energy poor households, we observe large changes in the eligibility rates as we 
change the definition of affordability. The eligibility rates are the lowest among the households 
classified as energy poor according to the budget share approach with the EC criterion threshold 
(38% for electricity and 33% for gas benefits), and the highest with the LIHC1 approach (61% for 
electricity and  53% for gas). 
Eligibility rates vary remarkably across household types and area: for example, among households 
in absolute poverty, the eligibility rate for the electricity benefit is 75.5% for the one-person 
households and 98.1% for households with two adults and at least three children. Similarly, for 
given income or energy poverty conditions, the eligibility rates in southern regions are higher than 
in the rest of the country. 
The fact that the eligibility criteria exclude a significant portion of households in need from the 
benefits is due to a combination of different reasons, three of which refer to the adoption of the 
Equivalent Economic Conditions Indicator (ISEE); in particular: 
(i) the Equivalent Economic Conditions Indicator (ISEE), which is used to assess the financial 
resources of the households, refers to a definition of income that differs from the one 
considered by standard poverty analyses. In fact, the ISEE considers the gross household 
income together with an estimate of the income produced by real estate and financial wealth, 
while the poverty statistics refer to net household income including imputed rents due to 
primary residence ownership and social transfers. Accounting for home-ownership and the 
value of real estate tend to decrease the eligibility rates of homeowners, in particular in the 
Northern regions and large cities, where the values of the houses are considerably higher than 
in the rest of the country. 
(ii) the Equivalent Economic Conditions Indicator (ISEE) is based on an equivalence scale that is 
slightly different from the one used for poverty definition. In particular, it attaches a relevant 
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weight to the presence of disabled individuals, single parents, presence of with children and 
occupational status, while the equivalence scale used for the poverty indicators considers only 
the size of the household and the age of its members. This can explain some of the differences 
in eligibility rates across different household types. 
(iii) the threshold value of the Equivalent Economic Conditions Indicator (ISEE) does not vary with 
the region of residence, while the components of the absolute poverty line are region-specific, 
as they consider differences in prices, housing markets and heating needs. This generates 
different eligibility rates across the regions of the country. 
(iv) the eligibility criteria do not depend on households' energy consumption; by design the policy 
is not particularly well suited to support consumers who face affordability problems despite 
their spending ability is above the subsistence level.  
(v) in order to be eligible for the gas benefit, the households must be connected to the natural 
gas network, and this dramatically reduces eligibility among households living in areas not 
served by the gas distribution grid. 
 4.3 A focus on the eligibility for benefits 
So far, we have studied the eligibility and the energy poverty rates by relying on simple descriptive 
statistics. Although informative, these tables do not allow us to disentangle the effects of the 
determinants that are at work at the same time. For instance, the difference across areas in the 
energy poverty rates may be simply due to the well-known differences in income across areas.  
In order to further investigate the main drivers of energy poverty and to evaluate to what extent 
the benefit policy adopted to support Italian vulnerable consumers in those market is able to 
target public resources to families in need, we resort to a multiple regression approach. Our goal is 
to show the key determinant of the probability of being energy poor and eligible for electricity 
benefits. Remind that electricity and gas benefits have the same income eligibility criterion, 
therefore if the household is eligible for the electricity benefit, it would be eligible also for gas 
benefit if it used natural gas. We analyse how the percentage of energy vulnerable households 
eligible for the energy benefits changes not only because of their ability to spend, but also 
depending on other characteristics, as family composition, occupational and tenure status. 
19 
 
We model the joint probability of being energy poor and eligible for the energy benefits by 
resorting to a bivariate probit model (see Cameron et al., 2005). We consider a household to be 
energy poor according to the Low Income High Cost criterion, in which: 
 the “low income” condition is assessed referring to the absolute poverty line, and  
 the “high cost” condition is satisfied if the incidence of energy spending on income is 
higher than the median energy budget shares of the (relatively) poor households of 
similar size living in the same climatic area. 
The probability of being energy poor is therefore a function of income level and energy spending. 
For given level of income and spending, the energy poverty status is affected also by household 
composition, area of residence, housing conditions and type of fuel used for heating.  
Household’s income is – in principle – the only determinant of the eligibility. In practice, this is 
not actually the case, because eligibility depends on an estimate of income from real estate and 
financial assets, which are not included in the standard definition of disposable income. The latter 
is instead routinely used in any household welfare analysis, both in Italy and in the European 
Union. This implies that the type and location of the accommodation and the tenure status affect 
the eligibility of the households, because of their impact on the real estate wealth.  
Furthermore, the way the eligibility criterion accounts for family composition and occupational 
status differs from the standard adjustment via equivalent scale. We therefore consider 
household composition and occupational status as possible determinants of the eligibility status, 
also once controlled for household adult equivalent disposable income.  
Overall, only the variables describing the type of fuels used and the incidence of energy spending 
on household disposable income affect exclusively the energy poverty status and not the 
eligibility one. We therefore specify the following multivariate model: 
    1 1 2 2h h h h h h hEnPov x z u Eli x u        1 1   
where EnPovh is a dummy variable equal 1 if household h is energy poor, zero otherwise; Elih is a 
dummy variable for the eligibility status; 1(.) is an indicator function that equals one if the 
condition in parentheses hold true and zero otherwise; xh is vector of household and 
accommodation characteristics, common to the two equations, zh is a vector with information on 
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the type of fuels used by the households and the incidence of energy expenditure on household 
income. The random components (uh1,uh2) are jointly normally distributed, independently and 
identically distributed with unitary variance and correlation . The unknown parameters 
 1 2, , ,     are estimated via maximum likelihood.  
As the bivariate probit model is highly non-linear, it is easier to assess the effect of the covariates 
on the outcomes by looking at the marginal effects of x and z on the probability of being energy 
poor and eligible, rather than simply looking at the estimated parameters. We thus consider the 
marginal effect on the probability of being energy poor, that is  Pr | , /h h h hEnPov x z x    and 
 Pr | , /h h h hEnPov x z z  , the probability of being eligible for the energy benefits 
 Pr | /h h hEli x x  ; and of the probability of being eligible, given that the household is energy 
poor,  Pr | 1, , /h h h h hEli EnPov x z x    and  Pr | 1, , /h h h h hEli EnPov x z z   .  
Table 6 shows estimated marginal effects computed at the average values of the covariates. As 
expected, an increase in income - Log(Adult equivalent disposable income) - reduces the 
probability of being energy poor and eligible for the benefits. Vice-versa, keeping income and the 
other characteristics constants, an increase in the energy budget shares raises the probability of 
being energy poor. Family composition plays a role in both marginal probabilities, but usually 
with opposite signs: at the mean values, the single-person household is the one least likely to be 
energy poor according to the LICH2 criterion, but it is the type of household most likely to be 
eligible for benefits, together with single parents. The conditional probability 
 Pr | 1, ,h h h hEli EnPov x z  confirms that – at the average values – the probability of a single-
person household to be eligible is the highest.  
There are significant territorial differences, also once controlled for compositional and income 
effects. The differences between homeowners and tenants are irrelevant for energy poverty, 
once income and other characteristics have been accounted for, while they persist as important 
determinants for eligibility: at the average values, the probability to be eligible for electricity 





Table 6: Marginal effects on the probability of being energy poor, eligible for energy benefits and eligible given that one is energy 
poor. Marginal effects computed at the mean values of the explanatory variables. Standard errors in parentheses, in italics 
reference option for qualitative variables. 
 (1) (2) (3) Sample 
 Pr(Energy poor) Pr(Eligible) Pr(Eligible| Energy poor) averages 
Household types     
Without children     
Single - - - 0.3030 
2 adults,  0.0007** -0.0120*** -0.0495** 0.1037 
both younger than 65 yrs (0.0003) (0.0030) (0.0215)  
2 adults,  0.0004** -0.0047 -0.0235 0.1490 
at least one over 65 yrs (0.0002) (0.0031) (0.0145)  
Others 0.0029*** -0.0133*** -0.0580** 0.1266 
 (0.0010) (0.0028) (0.0254)  
With children      
Single parent  0.0030* 0.0144* 0.0135 0.0309 
 (0.0017) (0.0078) (0.0186)  
2 adults, 1 child 0.0007** -0.0134*** -0.0548** 0.1057 
 (0.0003) (0.0028) (0.0229)  
2 adults, 2 children 0.0023*** -0.0120*** -0.0534** 0.1055 
 (0.0008) (0.0028) (0.0235)  
2 adults, 3 or  0.0049** 0.0302** 0.0421 0.0213 
more children (0.0022) (0.0124) (0.0257)  
Others 0.0095*** -0.0083** -0.0483** 0.0543 
 (0.0031) (0.0037) (0.0239)  
Area of residence     
North - - - 0.4828 
Centre 0.0015*** 0.0037** 0.0051 0.1989 
 (0.0005) (0.0018) (0.0057)  
South and Islands 0.0008** 0.0131*** 0.0342*** 0.3183 
 (0.0003) (0.0027) (0.0113)  
Degree of urbanization     
Densely populated area - - - 0.4391 
Intermediate area -0.0003 0.0036** 0.0134* 0.3993 
 (0.0002) (0.0016) (0.0070)  
Thinly populated area -0.0005** 0.0118*** 0.0403** 0.1615 
 (0.0002) (0.0030) (0.0160)  
Tenure status     
Outright owner - - - 0.6054 
Owner paying mortgage 0.0001 -0.0021 -0.0080 0.1371 
 (0.0003) (0.0016) (0.0062)  
Tenant at market rent  0.0001 0.0579*** 0.1454*** 0.1335 
 (0.0002) (0.0079) (0.0399)  
Tenant at reduced rent -0.0003 0.0470*** 0.1310*** 0.0485 
 (0.0002) (0.0090) (0.0415)  
Free accommodation -0.0000 0.0092** 0.0293** 0.0755 
 (0.0003) (0.0036) (0.0143)  
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 6 continued. Marginal effects on probability of being energy poor, eligible for energy benefits and eligible given that one is 
energy poor. Marginal effects computed at the mean values of the explanatory variables. Standard errors in parentheses, in 
italics reference option for qualitative variables. 
 (1) (2) (3) Sample 
 Pr(Energy poor) Pr(Eligible) Pr(Eligible| Energy poor) averages 
Dwelling type     
Detached house    0.2081 
Semi-detached house -0.0003 0.0019 0.0078 0.2565 
 (0.0002) (0.0023) (0.0080)  
In building < 10 units -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0001 0.2575 
 (0.0002) (0.0021) (0.0069)  
In building ≥ 10 units 0.0002 0.0003 -0.0002 0.2778 
 (0.0003) (0.0023) (0.0072)  
Number of rooms 0.0003*** -0.0034*** -0.0127** 3.2733 
 (0.0001) (0.0009) (0.0052)  
Occupational status     
Employee - - - 0.3729 
Self-employed -0.0000 -0.0015 -0.0055 0.1251 
 (0.0003) (0.0010) (0.0045)  
Unemployed -0.0000 0.0070** 0.0233** 0.0457 
 (0.0004) (0.0028) (0.0119)  
Retired -0.0005* 0.0193*** 0.0639*** 0.3247 
 (0.0003) (0.0034) (0.0234)  
Other out of labour force -0.0000 0.0326*** 0.0920*** 0.1316 
 (0.0003) (0.0061) (0.0303)  
Log(Adult equivalent  -0.0063*** -0.0699*** -0.1816*** 10.2760 
disposable income) (0.0016) (0.0060) (0.0452)  
With gas -0.0008**  0.0050 0.8742 
 (0.0004)  (0.0036)  
Using gas for heating -0.0004  0.0025 0.7231 
 (0.0002)  (0.0021)  
Energy spending/  0.1003***  -0.6408 0.0584 
Disposable income (0.0257)  (0.4132)  
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As the estimated model is non-linear, the differences between groups are not constant, and they 
depend on the value of all the variables at play. In particular, given the skewness of the income 
distribution, and the attention to the low-income households, it is worth considering how the 
differences between groups vary with income. In Figures 1 and 2 we plot the three probabilities
 Pr | ,h h hEnPov x z ,  Pr |h hEli x  and  Pr | 1, ,h h h hEli EnPov x z  for different level of income 
and by different subgroups of households. More specifically, we compute the probabilities at the 
1st, 5th, 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th and 95th percentiles of adult equivalent disposable income, 
keeping all other variables at their observed values. We expect the probabilities to be energy 
poor and eligible to be the highest for low values of income and drop to zero for affluent 
households. The speed at which this happens may differ between household groups. 
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Figure 1 shows the predicted probabilities for different level of income, by household type and 
occupational status. Looking at the probability of being energy poor, it is possible to observe how 
the predicted probability is different across different household types for low level of income and 
how the difference vanishes as income increases, becoming negligible around the median value of 
income. For the eligibility rate, the picture is rather different: there are no differences between 
types for very low levels of income (1st percentile), where all households are predicted to be 
eligible, then the differences widens reaching their maximum around the fifth percentile, and then 
decreases. Large differences in the eligibility probability are depicted also between different 
occupational status (second panel of Figure 1) and housing tenure (first panel of Figure 2), which 
instead do not affect energy poverty. The latter result is apparently in sharp contrast with the 
descriptive evidence provided in Table 4, where a considerably higher incidence of energy poverty 
is reported for tenants. The use of a multiple regression strategy allows us to say that such 
difference is mainly due to income differences between tenants and homeowners, that is, when 
tenants and homeowners of similar income level are confronted, there is no relevant difference in 
their probability of being energy poor.  
The regression analysis confirms the presence of a persistent difference in the regional eligibility 
rates: the second panel of Figure 2 shows that among energy poor households with adult 
equivalent income around the 5th percentile, the eligibility rate in the Southern regions is about 
65%, 10 percentage points higher than in the Centre and North areas. As previously explained, this 
can be due to the heterogeneity in price levels, housing values and different labour market 
participation rates. 
Overall, the graphs make evident that, ceteris paribus, the eligibility criterion does not guarantee 
equal opportunity of access to the benefits, but it rather privileges the households with children, 






Figure 1: Predicted probability of being energy poor and eligible for energy benefits as function of adult equivalent disposable 
























Figure 2: Predicted probability of being energy poor and eligible for energy benefits as function of adult equivalent disposable 





















5   Conclusions
Alternative indices of affordability in energy consumption focus on different aspects of the energy 
poverty; any sensible indicator should combine information on households income and the 
achievement of a minimum standard of quality of life, also considering under-spending as a 
potential cause of deprivation. The actual implementation of these principles has to deal with the 
nature of the available data and it needs to be complemented by a precise analysis of the 
determinants of the affordability problem.  
In this chapter we have shortly presented alternative indices of affordability in energy 
consumption (i.e. budget share approach and Low Income High Cost approach) and provided their 
measurement for Italy in 2012. Our results highlight the different pictures about Italian vulnerable 
consumers in energy markets from adopting the alternative  indices.  
We then describe the Italian scheme of energy benefits which consists of a lump-sum contribution 
on the vulnerable consumers’ bills. The amount of the both electricity and gas benefits refers to 
the number of household components; the amount is for both independent of the household’s 
actual consumption; and the gas benefit depends on the index about climatic conditions of the 
area of the households’ residence. The policy provides a limited benefit to a potentially large 
number of beneficiaries: in 2012, the amount of the electricity benefit ranged between 63 euro 
per year for a couple and 139 euro for a household with more than 4 members (plus 10% VAT); 
the amount of the gas benefit ranged from 85 euro for a household with less than 5 members 
living in the warmest part of the county, to 318 euro for a household with at least 5 members 
living in the coldest areas (plus 21% VAT).  
Our empirical results show the changes in the eligibility rates, according to the alternative 
definition of affordability in energy consumption. We also discuss several reasons why the 
adopted eligibility criteria excludes a significant proportion of Italian households in need from the 
benefits. 
Finally, we set a multiple regression model to investigate the key determinant of the probability of 
being energy poor and eligible for energy benefits. As expected, an increase in income reduces the 
probability of being energy poor and eligible for energy benefits; keeping income and the other 
characteristics constants, an increase in the energy budget shares raises the probability of being 
energy poor. Family composition plays a role in both marginal probabilities, but usually with 
opposite signs: at the mean values, the single-person household is the one least likely to be energy 
poor according to the LICH2 criterion, but it is the type of household most likely to be eligible for 
benefits, together with single parents. At the average values, the probability of a single-person 
household to be eligible is the highest. There are significant territorial differences, also once 
controlled for compositional and income effects. All in all, our analysis shows that, ceteris paribus, 
the eligibility criterion does not guarantee equal opportunity of access to the benefits, but it 
rather privileges the households with children, those households whose head is unemployed, the 
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